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Antitrust and Professional Sport: Does Anyone
Play by the Rules of the Game?
Professional sports leagues1 are comprised of individual teams 2 which have
banded together for the purpose of creating regularly scheduled competitive
exhibitions between the teams within the leagues. The leagues differ, of
course, due to the different sports involved, but the make-up is generally
similar. Each has a set number of teams, most of which are individually
owned. The teams have agreed to establish a league which will uniformly
regulate the actions of its members. The team owners elect a president or
commissioner, who is responsible for the administration of the league and its
efficient and profitable operation.
Although the leagues necessarily affect the relations of the teams and the
players, they also have a significant influence upon our society. Immedi-
ately recognizable, of course, is the impact of professional sport on our leisure
activity. Professional sport is also big business. The impact of professional
sports leagues extends far beyond those directly involved, and significantly
affects the commercial life of the cities in which the teams play.3 It seems
that the leisure aspects of professional sports have had the effect of over-
shadowing their commercial nature. As a commercial enterprise, the activi-
ties of the leagues must be measured against the antitrust laws.4 This cor-
1. For the purposes of this article professional sport is limited to the major
league professional sports existing within the United States; included within the defini-
tion are: National Football League (hereinafter referred to as the NFL); National
Basketball Association (hereinafter referred to as the NBA); American Basketball
Association (hereinafter referred to as the ABA); Major League Baseball; National
Hockey League (hereinafter referred to as the NHL); World Hockey Association
(hereinafter referred to as the WHA).
2. There are 24 Major League Baseball teams; 26 NFL teams; 17 NBA teams;
10 ABA teams; 16 NHL teams; 12 WHA teams;
3. Witness the extremes gone to by Mayor John Lindsay to keep the Yankees in
New York. The Mayor convinced the City Council to purchase Yankee Stadium and
then spend $25 million to refurbish it. This activity, on the part of the city, came
soon after the Yankees had let it be known that they were considering a move to New
Jersey. It has been estimated that the Giants baseball club generated more than $325
million in commerce in one year in San Francisco. FAcTs, BASEBALL IN THE COM-
MUNITY C 3 (1965) (issued by the Commissioner of Baseball). Even using a more
conservative evaluation method, it was found that $15 million of out of town commerce
was brought to Minneapolis by the Twins. Id.
4. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1970).
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ment will attempt to analyze the problems which exist, in an antitrust con-
text, as a result of the present relationship of the leagues to players and
teams. More specifically, it will deal with restraints on the players' ability
to bargain and restraints upon the independent operation of the teams.
Antitrust Policy
The enactment of the antitrust laws was an expression of the national belief
that free enterprise and competition are the most effective and productive
methods of regulating economic activity, and that the classic rule of "supply
and demand" should determine the price and quantity of goods available.5
Strict interpretation of the Sherman Act dictates that, with the exception
of vertical agreements fixing the price of fair-traded items,6 all agreements in
restraint of trade are illegal. Indeed, this interpretation was prevalent in
the early years of antitrust enforcement. 7 However, the Supreme Court, in
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States s ruled that the
Sherman Act proscribed only unreasonable restraints of trade: thus was
born the socalled "rule of reason" test which governs most antitrust decisions:
[ . . T]he thrust of the rule of reason approach is that the courts
will consider the effect of the agreement upon the entire industry
in question in light of prevailing conditions, and if found unduly
restrictive, or if the dominant purpose of the agreement is the re-
straint of trade, the agreement will be held violative of the Sher-
man Act. Conversely, if the industry can demonstrate an over-
riding justification for the restrictive agreement in rule of reason
cases, such agreements will generally be held legal. In short, the
legality of agreements in this type of situation is determined on a
case-by-case basis.9
However, the Supreme Court has found that certain activities are so contrary
to the public policy favoring competition that they have been declared per
se illegal.10 Among these activities which have been declared per se illegal
5. See REPORT ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (March 1, 1955).
6. This exception was added by Act of Aug. 17, 1937 ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat.
693 amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
7. Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, 152 F. 864
(3rd Cir. 1907). The court stated:
Every vontract or combination, therefore, whether reasonable or unreasonable,
which directly restrains or which necessarily operates in restraint of trade or
commerce among the states, is denounced and made unlawful by the act.
id. at 868.
8. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
9. Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of
Anachronism, 12 WM. & MAY L. REv. 859, 869 (1971).
10. The per se rule requires that the question to be answered first by the court is
whether the restraint complained of by the plaintiff constitutes a specific type of ac-
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are: division of markets," group boycotts, and concerted refusals to deal.12
League Structure
Housekeeping Rules
The league structure poses a unique problem for the antitrust laws. While
our antitrust policy was formulated to encourage competition within a de-
fined market by economically independent units,"3 the leagues encourage a
certain amount of cooperation among competitors. Although the goal for
which the teams strive is competition on the playing field, it is necessary for
the teams to cooperate with each other on administrative matters. Cooper-
ation is necessary because professional teams have found that organized
league play generates more excitement and sustained fan interest than do
random individual games. League play lends itself to a race for league
championships and the generation of allegiance to particular teams by the
fans. To make the race realistic, teams must play an equal number of
games with nearly identical schedules of opponents under identical rules.
There is also a need for cooperation in scheduling, and in formulating rules
of play:
The basic 'housekeeping' arrangements of league sports such as
scheduling, limits on team rosters, and uniform playing rules
throughout the league are the deviations from a purely competitive
model which are most clearly necessitated by the nature of the
industry.14
It is submitted that rules of this type are essential to a league structure, and
although this cooperation involves a certain deviation from the ideal of free
competition, it is justified because it makes possible a product which unlim-
ited competition could not produce. A similar rationale was upheld in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States. 5 There, the Supreme Court
was faced with a rule of the Board of Trade which fixed bids at the closing
price until the opening of the next session. The purpose of the rule was to
promote the convenience of Board members, by restricting their hours of
tivity classified illegal, e.g. group boycott. If it is proven that, in fact, one of his for-
bidden practices exists the per se rule applies and there is no defense of reasonableness
in the situation. If there is no proof that a certain activity constituted a per se activity
the activity may still be found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule
of reason.
11. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
12. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
13. See supra note 5.
14. The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and The
Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (1967).
15. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See also Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283
U.S. 163 (1931); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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business, and to break a grain trade monopoly which had been acquired by
four or five warehousemen in Chicago. As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 18
In Board of Trade, there was a stimulation of commerce. The formation
of organized leagues in professional sports yields the same result. The rules
standardizing play should be upheld in the same fashion as the rules in
Board of Trade:
Where it is alleged that the structure of an industry makes such
combination economically desirable, the courts have generally de-
cided the lawfulness of its arrangements under the antitrust laws by
balancing the alleged economic benefits against the potential evils
and have allowed reasonable restraints, even when they fall into
a category usually regarded as per se illegal.' 7
Restrictive Measures
However, in addition to the housekeeping arrangements necessary for their
operation, the leagues have adopted more restrictive arrangements con-
trolling the players and the teams, specifically, the reserve system, player
drafts, and blacklisting. Each of these arrangements, as they are found
within the respective sport league, will be examined and the antitrust aspects
discussed.
Reserve Systems
1. Baseball
Contained in every contract signed by a major league baseball player is a
reserve clause.' 8 This clause, as it applies to major league baseball, is
more than a single clause affecting that player and his team. 19 In actuality
16. 246 U.S. at 238.
17. Supra note 14, at 419.
18. BASEBALL BLUE BOOK 512 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as BLUE BOOK) Rule
3(a):
On or before January 15 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding business
day) of the year next following the last playing season covered by this
contract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that
year by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his signature
hereto. . . . If prior to March 1 next succeeding said January 15, the Player
and the Club have not agreed upon the terms of such contract, then on or be-
fore 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have the right by written
notice to the Player at said address to renew this contract for the period of
one year on the same terms, except that the amount payable to the Player
shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice, provided, that said amount,
if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be an amount payable at a rate not
less than 75% of the rate stipulated for the preceeding year.
19. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82nd Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1952).
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it is a system composed of a series of clauses in the standard player contract
providing that a club may renew the player's contract for the ensuing season,
that those players whose contracts have been renewed may not play for any
other club, and that a club may not negotiate with a player who has a con-
tract with another club.20 As stated by one commentator:
Once a player initially signs a contract to play professional base-
ball . . . . he is relegated to negotiating with and playing for one
organization unless he decides to retire from active participation,
or his contract is assigned to another club, or he is released as a
free agent. 21
Major league baseball has used this reserve system since 1879. During
the 1870's a furious bidding war for players developed among the existing
professional baseball teams in the National League. The results of the
bidding war were predictable. The wealthy clubs from the populous urban
areas continually outbid their less affluent rivals, and thereby attracted the
best players. The poorer clubs were outclassed on the field and one by one
experienced loss of fan support. The better clubs faced the prospect of
escalating bidding, and the fans were becoming bored by the dominance of
certain teams. Spiraling player salaries, combined with declining gate re-
ceipts, rendered it impossible for any team to show a profit, and as a result
The reserve clause is popularly believed to be some provision in the player
contract which gives the club in organized baseball which first signs a player a
continuing and exclusive right to his services. Commissioner Frick testified
that this popular understanding was essentially correct. He pointed out, how-
ever, that the reserve clause is not merely a provision in the contract, but also
incorporates a reticulated system of rules and regulations which enable, indeed
require, the entire baseball organization to respect and enforce each club's
exclusive and continuous right to the services of its players.
20. The following provisions of the reserve clause of professional baseball appeared
in Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 274 nn.5, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
3(g) Tampering. To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent the
enticement of players, coaches, managers and umpires, there shall be no ne-
gotiations or dealings respecting employment, either present or prospective,
between any player, coach or manager and any club other than the club with
which he is under contract or acceptance of terms, or by which he is reserved,
or which has the player on its Negotiation List, . . . unless the club or league
with which he is connected shall have, in writing, expressly authorized such
negotiations or dealings prior to their commencement.
The reserve rule, Major League Rule 4-A, provides in part:
On or before November 15 in each year, each Major League Club shall
transmit to the Commissioner and to its League President a list of not ex-
ceeding forty (40) active and eligible players, whom the club desires to re-
serve for the ensuing season; and also a list of all its players who have been
promulgated as placed on the Military, Voluntary Retired, Restricted, Dis-
qualified, Suspended or Ineligible Lists; and such players signed under Rule 4
who do not count in the club's under control limit . . . [N]o player on any
list shall be eligible to play for or negotiate with any club until his contract
has been assigned or he has been released.
21. Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. REV. 459, 462.
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the National League had lost eight of its original 15 teams to bankruptcy by
1879.22 It was under the threat of financial ruin that the surviving seven
teams of the National League met in 1879 and secretly agreed to "reserve,"
free from economic competition, five players apiece for the approaching
season. 23  As evidenced by the financial position of major league baseball
today,24 the secret meeting in 1879 proved to be a most fortuitous event in
the history of the league.
Today, once a player reaches the position of negotiating with a team, he
must follow a prescribed procedure. The teams within the league have
formulated an agreement among themselves whereby they agree not to deal
with players except upon certain conditions. 2  All players must sign a Uni-
form Player Contract 26 which provides inter alia that if a player does not
sign a contract by the first of March with the club that he played for during
the previous season, the club may unilaterally renew his contract and cut
his salary no more than 20% .27 Any renewal contract will contain
another renewal provision, thus binding the player perpetually. If the club
so desires it may assign the player's contract to any of the other clubs. 28
The teams have also agreed that no club may negotiate with a player re-
served by another club. 29 Finally, any player who fails to report to his club
is placed on a Restricted List, and if he violates his contract of "reservation,"
he is placed on the Disqualified List.30
This system seriously curtails the player's bargaining position, for al-
though club management may feel the urge to reward an individual player
for a particularly good season, the team need not be bargained into that
position by the player. A player unsatisfied with a final contract offer has
only two alternatives, play for the unsatisfactory sum or quit. Only when a
player is given his outright release does he have the opportunity to negotiate
with the clubs of his choice.
Strictly speaking, the actions of the teams in imposing the requirements
of the reserve system result in the threat of group boycott 3l if the require-
22. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. at 18-22 (1952).
23. Id. at 22.
24. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract Of the United States: 1968, at
777 (89th edition.) Washington, D.C., (1968) reports that 158 baseball establish-
ments grossed $68 million in 1968.
25. See BLUE BOOK 512-14, Rules 3(a), (g).
26. BLUE BOOK 512, Rule 3(a).
27. Id. at Section 10(a).
28. Id. at Section 6(a).
29. Id. at 513-14, Rule 3(g).
30. Id. at 545, Rule 15,
31. A group boycott is generally defined, in an antitrust context, as a confederation
to prevent the carrying on of business with a certain individual, thus in antitrust
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ments are not followed. It seems basic to the principle of free competition
that a team should be free to refuse to deal with a player. Possibly his
salary demands are too high, or his personality doesn't fit with the manage-
ment of the team, or he cannot play at a competitive level. Whatever the
reason, the team should be free to refuse to deal, and the player would have
to look to another team. Acting as an independent unit, a team's refusal to
deal would not run counter to antitrust policy. In United States v. Colgate
& Co.,32 the Supreme Court ruled that businessmen are free to refuse to deal
with customers or suppliers absent combination, conspiracy, or purpose to
monopolize. This broad pronouncement was narrowed in United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co. 33  The Colgate principle of customer selection was lim-
ited to situations where if a certain policy is announced by X and Y violates
that policy, X may unilaterally refuse to deal with Y.3 4  The Court pro-
scribed any activity by which X would attempt to force acceptance of its
policy and in so doing exercise a control over the free flow of commerce.
Such control would be inherently anti-competitive. Thus the presence or
absence of coercion, in a refusal to deal, may be determinative of its legality.
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,35 the Supreme Court ruled that defendant's
refusal to renew the lease on plaintiff's service station was coercive since the
decision was the result of plaintiff's price-cutting of gasoline supplied by
defendant. Being a coercive response, to force acceptance of defendant's
policy, it was found to be outside the bounds of Parke, Davis and therefore an
illegal restraint on trade.
The effect of the reserve system is to force the player to accept the pre-
scribed conditions of employment or be banned from playing major league
baseball.3 6  The group boycott has been held per se violative of the anti-
trust laws. As stated by the Supreme Court in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc.:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.
terms a concerted refusal to deal. Such activity has been proscribed since Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
32. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
33. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
34. In Parke, Davis the activity which the Court proscribed consisted of Parke,
Davis' coercive attempts to set a retail price maintenance scheme. In enforcing its
suggested retail price policy, Parke, Davis went beyond refusing to deal with price-
cutting retailers and used the threat of refusing to deal with the wholesale suppliers
of such price cutters, thus bringing the wholesalers to pressure the price-cutters.
35. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
36. See BLUE BOOK at 545, Rule 15. The player may be placed on either the Re-
stricted List of the Disqualified List for disobeying the provisions of the reserve
system. The teams have thus agreed not to deal unless their terms are accepted and
the player enters the negotiations under the threat that he will not be allowed to play
anywhere unless he agrees to the reserve system.
1973]
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They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable
in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they
'fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or
brought about a deterioration in quality.' 37
The Major League Book of Rules known as the Blue Book, contains a plan
to boycott those who do not contract in the manner prescribed.38  There-
fore, the group boycott found in major league baseball should be declared
illegal.
Labor Exemption.
It has been argued by some39 that baseball's reserve system is immune from
attack under the antitrust laws since it is incorporated into a collective
bargaining agreement between the players and the league:
There is, however, no reason to think that as between employers
and employees engaged in collective bargaining the antitrust laws
either have or ought to have any application whatsoever to the
determination of terms and conditions of employment. 40
The argument continues that if the players are not satisfied with the reserve
clauses, their relief must be sought at the bargaining table or under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. There is merit in the proposal to employ col-
lective bargaining to remedy some of the differences between the players
and the owners. However, because certain matters can be subjects of col-
lective bargaining, it does not follow that this susceptibility to bargaining
must bar application of the Sherman Act. In the antitrust area, agree-
ments reached by collective bargaining have not been held to be ipso facto
reasonable. In Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,41 the Su-
preme Court held that an agreement which effected a concerted refusal to
deal except by a standard form contract which was unreasonably restrictive,
constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade even though the agreement
was the product of six years of bargaining and discussion. The Court stated:
It may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of the
motion picture industry; but when under the guise of arbitration
parties enter into unusual arrangements which unreasonably sup-
press normal competition their action becomes illegal.42
37. 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
38. Supra note 30.
39. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes:
Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
40. Id. at 21. The authors are raising a jurisdictional impediment to the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws in those areas which require collective bargaining. See 39
U.S.C. § 151-68 (1964). This thesis rests on the proposition that the NLRA offers
the only relief in the area of mandatory subjects of bargaining.
41. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
42. Id. at 43.
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Mr. Justice Goldberg's written brief to the Supreme Court in Flood v.
Kuhn,43 arguing for a finding of per se illegality, also expressed this same
reasoning:
But even here, Baseball's sudden enthusiasm for "collective bar-
gaining" on this issue is beside the point. This is an antitrust
suit challenging a per se antitrust violation, a concerted group boy-
cott-the kind of unlawful employer conduct which this court has
repeatedly refused to immunize from judicial scrutiny under the
antitrust laws, just as the hypothetical susceptibility to collective
bargaining of an unlawful employer practice does not insulate from
judicial redress failure to pay a legally prescribed minimum wage,
or racial discrimination in employment, or any other violation of
the law.44
It seems that Mr. Justice Goldberg has pointed to the weakness in the labor
argument. If one were to follow the argument of the labor exemption in
the antitrust area, what is to prevent the exemption of civil rights laws, voting
rights, etc. in the same type of situation. Therefore, with the authority
of Paramount Famous rendering immaterial the proposition that collective
bargaining should prevent antitrust enforcement, the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of baseball's reserve system should be determined in light of
its restrictive effect on the player's bargaining ability.
2. Football
The device by which professional football maintains personnel continuity is
an option clause, which is, in effect, a variation of the reserve system. 45
43. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum at 3-4. Flood v. Kuhn is discussed
more fully infra text at notes 87-103. Concededly, Mr. Justice Goldberg may be
charged with a certain amount of inconsistency if we view his concurring opinion in
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965):
[t]he National Labor Relations Act . . . declares it to be the policy of the
United States to promote the establishment of wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment by free collective bargaining between em-
ployers and unions. The Act further provides that both employers and unions
must bargain about such mandatory subjects of bargaining. This national
scheme would be virtually destroyed by the imposition of Sherman Act crimi-
nal and civil penalties upon employers and unions engaged in such collective
bargaining. To tell the parties that they must bargain about a point but
may be subject to antitrust penalties if they reach an agreement is to stultify
the congressional scheme.
It must be remembered, however, that Justice Goldberg was speaking of wages and
hours, if he were to rule on the reserve clause, the majority opinion of Justice White in
Jewel Tea would be more in line with his brief in the Flood case. Justice White ruled
that the correct test of antitrust immunity is to balance the labor policies at stake in
the collective agreement against the antitrust policies threatened by the specific pro-
vision.
44. id. at 4.
45. See Standard Player Contract for Major Professional Football Operations as
conducted by the National Football League, §§ 10 COUNSELINO PROFESSIONAL ATH-
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This seemingly more liberal plan is no doubt the result of Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League,40 where the Supreme Court limited the antitrust ex-
emption to baseball and held that professional football was subject to the
antitrust laws.
The option clause allows a club to renew a player's contract unilaterally
for one year at a reduction in salary of not more than 10%. The player
may either play that year or sit it out, but in any event he is bound to the
original club for one year beyond his contract year. At the end of the year
he is denominated a "free agent" and is theoretically able to negotiate his
own deal with any club. To this point the option clause seems a favorable
replacement of the reserve system. It gives the teams a certain stability
with reference to personnel and yet allows for negotiations and bargaining
as encouraged by the spirit of the antitrust laws. Thus, when the system
was attacked in Dallas Cowboys Football Club v. Harris,47 the Court held
that the option clause was not so unreasonable and harsh as to be unenforce-
able in equity. 48 However, in addition to the basic provisions of the option
clause, there has been added a provision known as the Rozelle Rule. The
rule is as follows:
Any player, whose contract with a League Club has expired,
shall thereupon become a free agent and shall no longer be con-
sidered a member of that club following the expiration date of
such contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such
manner, thereafter signs a contract with a different club in the
League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been
concluded between the two League clubs, the Commissioner may
name and then award to the former club one or more players
from the Active, Reserve or Selection List (including future selec-
tion choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner, in his
sole discretion, deems fair and equitable; any such decision by
the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive.49
LETES AND ENTERTAINERS 377, 381 (1970):
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player, on or before the
first day of May following the football season referred to in Par. 1 hereof,
renew his contract for a further term of one (1) year on the same terms as
are provided by this contract, except that (1) the Club may fix the rate of
compensation to be paid by the Club to the Player during said further terms,
which rate of compensation shall not be less than ninety percent (90%) of
the sum set forth in Par. 3 hereof, and shall be payable in installments during
the football season in such further term as provided in Par. 3; and (2) after
such renewal this contract shall not include a further option to the Club to
renew this contract.
46. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
47. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). See also Hennigan v. Chargers Football
Company, 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 47.
49. Due to the tremendous power given to the Commissioner in these circumstances
the rule has been named after Pete Rozelle, the present Commissioner of the NFL.
[Vol. 22:403
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Aside from various problems this system encounters under contract law, the
Rozelle Rule is clearly a restraint upon the bargaining opportunities which
the free agent supposedly possesses. The Rozelle Rule effectively vitiates
the free operation of the option clauses and thus eliminates any harmony
that the option clause had with the antitrust laws.
The Harris decision was handed down some time before the players had,
as a group, begun to assert their economic rights. Thus, the restrictive ef-
fect of the option clause coupled with the Rozelle Rule was not truly known.
However, as of training camp 1972, 32 free agents had filed suit against
Commissioner Pete Rozelle and the NFL owners charging violations of the
antitrust laws. The players specifically alleged that the owners refused to
" ' . deal and negotiate with any player who has become, in theory, a free
agent."'50 Thus, the players are alleging that the same per se antitrust vio-
lations found in the operation of the reserve system in baseball 1 exist in
professional football. Existence of the Rozelle Rule strongly suggests that
they do.
3. Basketball
Basketball has also operated under a form of the reserve system,5 2 and as
the standard contract was written it provided the team with a perpetual
Art. XII, § 3, National Football League Constitution and By Laws (as amended
Jan. 29, 1963). The operation of the Rozelle Rule was demonstrated in the case of
David Parks. Parks had played out his option with the San Francisco 49'ers and
negotiated a contract with the New Orleans Saints. The teams were unable to reach
terms on a suitable compensation for the acquisition of Parks by the Saints. The
Commissioner awarded San Francisco the first round draft choice of New Orleans for
1967 (Kevin Hardy) as well as the first round pick for the following year. Measured
by the standards of a normal trade, this award was a severe penalty upon New Or-
leans. The award was also a clear warning to other clubs to maintain a hands off
policy on free agents, thus forcing free agents to remain with their original teams and
rendering the option clause ineffectual.
50. The Washington Post, July 27, 1972, § D at 7, col. 1.
51. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 593 (1959).
52. As it appeared in Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979, 981
(M.D.N.C. 1969) the NBA Uniform Contract provides:
On or before September 1 next following the last playing season covered by
this contract and renewals and extensions thereof, the Club may tender to the
Player a contract for the next succeeding season by mailing the same to the
Player at his address shown below, or if none is shown, then at his address
last known to the Club. If the Player fails, neglects, or omits to sign and
return such contract to the Club so that the Club receives it on or before
October Ist next succeeding, then this contract shall be deemed renewed and
extended for the period of one year, upon the same terms and conditions in all
respects as are provided herein, except that the compensation payable to the
Player shall be the sum provided in the contract tendered to the Player pur-
suant to the provisions hereof, which compensation shall in no event be less
than 75% of the compensation payable to the Player for the last playing
season covered by this contract and renewals and extensions thereof.
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right to the player's services. The reserve system was changed to an option
clause through the interpretation of the Cuyohoga County (Ohio) Court of
Common Pleas in Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett.53 Barnett
played for the Syracuse Nationals of the NBA, and in 1959 had signed an
NBA Uniform Player Contract which contained the reserve clause. In 1961,
Barnett entered into a contract to play with the Cleveland Pipers of the now
defunct American Basketball League. The Nationals brought suit to enjoin
Barnett from playing with any other team. The irony of the case is in the
fact that Barnett argued that a reserve system bound him perpetually, and
the contract therefore should be declared void. The club, however, argued
that if a player did not sign a new contract, the club had the right to renew
the contract for only one year, and at the end of the renewal year, the con-
tract was completed. Thus, the Nationals argued for the more liberal inter-
pretation of the contract in their attempt to retain Barnett. The court agreed
with the Nationals and enjoined Barnett from playing for anyone but the
plaintiff during the 1961-62 season. This decision in effect incorporated
the option clause into the NBA contract. 54 This inclusion of an option clause
in the NBA contract was supported in Lemat Corp. v. Barry.5 Plaintiff,
Rick Barry,"6 alleged that the NBA reserve clause was a contract of adhe-
sion.57 The court of appeals supported this allegation and ruled that "any
agreement that limits a person's ability to follow his vocation must be strictly
construed. . . ."5s Since contracts of adhesion are strictly construed against
The Club's right to renew this contract, as herein provided, and the promise
of the Player not to play otherwise than for the Club and its assignees, have
been taken into consideration in determining the amount of compensation
payable under paragraph 2 hereof.
53. 19 Ohio App. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (1961).
54. The court relied on the legal maxim that if the language of the contract is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will render the contract valid and give
effect to the obligations of the parties, and the other will render it invalid and ineffec-
tual, the valid construction is to be adopted. 19 Ohio App. 2d at 133, 181 N.E.2d at
509.
55. Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1969).
56. Barry initially signed with the San Francisco Warriors of the NBA for the
1965-66 season. Subsequently, he renewed his contract for the 1966-67 season, and the
contract contained the standard NBA reserve clause. In September 1967, Barry
signed a contract with the Oakland Oaks of the ABA. Under the contract, Barry was
to begin playing with the Oaks in the 1967-68 season. However, Lemat obtained an
injunction and Barry did not play for anyone during the 1967-68 season. He began to
play for the Oaks in the 1968-69 season. Lemat appealed his one year injunction, but
the court found the NBA contract, as written, to be a contract of adhesion and Lemat
was limited to the one year injunction. See supra note 55.
57. Generally, a contract of adhesion is defined as a standardized contract, im-
posed and drafted by a party of superior bargaining strength, that leaves to the sub-
scribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. See generally
Corbin, CONTRACTS 221 et seq. (1952).
58. Cal. App. 2d at 678, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
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the superior party, Uniform Player Contracts should be interpreted in favor
of the players, whenever possible. This position is in line with the majority
of decisions in this type of case.59
Summary
Viewed strictly in terms of harmony with the antitrust laws, each of the pro-
fessional sports leagues has attempted to practice a form of group boycott.
The leagues argue that the reserve systems, which in effect force the players
to accept league terms or no terms, are essential to the operations and very
existence of the leagues. The baseball owners argue that without the reserve
system the rich teams would necessarily buy all the best talent. The league
structure would weaken and fan support would evaporate. The same argu-
ments are espoused by the professional football owners. At first glance
these arguments do have weight and there is no question that league domi-
nation by the richest clubs would be detrimental to the maintenance of par-
ity among the teams and consequently continued fan support. However,
the experience of basketball has shown that a league will not necessarily fail
if the players are given more economic freedom. Under the present cir-
cumstances, basketball players enjoy the greatest freedom to negotiate. This
is the result of an option clause unburdened by a Rozelle Rule and the ex-
istence of two separate leagues.
The reserve system has had the questionable effect of restraining the
player's right to negotiate, and of stabilizing player salaries at levels which
are unquestionably lower than they would be in a more liberal economic
atmosphere. These restraints are the actual effects of the existing system,
whereas the owners' arguments against alteration of the system are based
on their fears of what could happen. The courts should not be in the posi-
tion of protecting the special economic interests of those involved in possible
antitrust violations. It is the duty of those engaged in alleged violations
of the antitrust laws to conform their actions to the requirements of those
laws. It is not the duty of the courts to conform the antitrust laws to fit a
restrictive system of commerce. Therefore, the group boycotts found in pro-
fessional sports must be treated as any other group boycott and found per
se violative of the antitrust laws.
59. E.g., Adams v. Adams, 156 Neb. 778, 790, 58 N.W.2d 172, 179 (1953) held
that, "the law does not look with favor upon restrictions against competition, and an
agreement which limits the right of a person to engage in a business or occupation will
be strictly construed and will not be extended by implication or construction beyond the
fair or natural import of the language used." See also Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc.,
163 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), Securities Acceptance Corporation v. Brown,
106 N.W.2d 456, 171 Neb. 406 (1960).
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Player Drafts
The restraining effect of the reserve and option clauses upon the bargaining
positions of the players has been further intensified by the uniform player
drafts. A form of player draft is currently used by all the professional
sports leagues. Due to the existence of two rival leagues in basketball and
hockey, these sports actually have two drafts, one by each league. This af-
fords the drafted player the limited choice of the league he would like to
play with. This, of course, gives the player the benefit of bargaining one
league against the other. 60 This limited choice, however, does not exist in
either baseball or football, where there is a single draft within each sport.
Basically, the draft system operates in the following manner in all sports:
teams are allocated a certain number of selections, an equal number for all
teams; the teams then select, in reverse order of their league standings, grad-
uating high school or college athletes.61 Baseball's draft is somewhat less
restrictive in that if the player does not wish to play for the club which
drafted him he may refuse to sign; he is then placed back into the eligible
draft pool for the next year. 62 Despite its less restrictive nature, the baseball
draft has the same net result as football's, the virtual elimination of bonuses.
The draft, which ostensibly was created to equalize player talent and avoid
bidding wars that prohibited effective competition for new players by the
poorer clubs, has eliminated economic competition for new players and has
taken from the player his economic lever, the bonus. For these reasons,
60. The value of even a limited right to bargain is unquestionable. Basketball
players, as a result of the competitive bidding situation existing between the two
leagues, are the highest paid professional athletes. This is true in both salary and
bonuses for signing. See 531 ATRR A-12 (9/28/71).
61. The rule restricting draft selections to graduating college students has been al-
tered in basketball due to the competitive situation existing between the two leagues.
Hardship drafts, the drafting of economically needy students, are now permitted. An
analysis which offers a possible reason for the college rule, as well as a reason to drop
it is found in Schneiderman, Professional Sport: Involuntary Servitude and the Popular
Will, 7 Gonzaga L. Rev. 63, 78 (1971).
Professional sport, with a pretense of concern that each talented youngster
should secure a college education, had decreed, conspiratorily, that a football
or basketball playing boy cannot be 'drafted" from out of the collegiate Minor
League until his .college class has been graduated. If the Class has been gradu-
ated, it is, of course immaterial whether or not the boy himself, graduated.
It is fairly transparent that the entire scheme is a matter of sport's economics
that stands unrelated to the educational purpose. Under this tolerated sys-
tem, not only can professional sport management have fair assurance that
the young athlete will have. received preprofessional training during his col-
legiate years, but also it can plan its annual "player draft" in the knowledge that
the number of draft eligibles to be "scouted" and "bid-for" will be limited
and will be readily identifiable.
This view may have support in the fact that concern over college education has
evaporated as the competitive situation changes.
62. BLUE BOOK 517-22, Rule 4.
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the draft is open to attack on antitrust grounds. The potential player is
again faced with a concerted refusal to deal unless he deals in the manner
prescribed by the league and in a manner which is injurious to him eco-
nomically.
The draft system is an agreement among the competitive units in the
league (the individual teams) not to compete in a specified market (new
players). Each of the teams is given the exclusive right to negotiate with the
drafted player free from economic competition of the other teams. Compe-
tition among the contracting parties is eliminated even more completely
than if the parties had agreed on price but still competed in the relevant mar-
ket. Agreements of this type only result in the elimination of competition.
A player is restricted to bargaining with one team, rather than given the
opportunity to bargain with twenty. This is clearly a restraint on trade;
cf. the holding of the Supreme Court in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States63 finding a similar non-competitive agreement per se illegal
should apply.
Blacklisting
The club owners have enforced their rules by the use of the blacklist. Simply
stated, the blacklist is the banning of a player from a league. 64 Its existence
has been justified as an effective means of preserving league integrity. De-
spite antitrust objections, namely a conspiracy to restrain the free entrance
of a player into league exhibitions, the blacklisting of players for the purpose
of maintaining public respect for professional sports by the elimination of
gamblers has been upheld.65 Undeniably, there is a legitimate interest to
eradicate the danger of gambling influences in the area of competitive sports.
However, the possibility of abuse is overwhelming, and this danger is not
merely speculative. The leagues have used the blacklist improperly. Pro-
fessional football owners reportedly blacklisted Bernie Parish, former All-
Pro, for attempting to organize football players into a union."6 Players have
been blacklisted for performing in a competitive league. 67  In the Gardella
v. Chandler case, 68 the circuit court ruled that an allegation of blacklisting
was sufficient to constitute a cause of action. However, the suit was settled
63. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
64. See Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. REV. 459,
465 n. 32 (1970).
65. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
66. Supra note 14, at 426.
67. See Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949);
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
68. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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prior to any court ruling. Baseball owners seemingly used the blacklist
against All-Star third baseman Clete Boyer after he made public a disagree-
ment with Atlanta Braves General Manager Paul Richards.69
The blacklist is the means of enforcing the other restrictive devices 70 em-
ployed in professional sports. The blacklist involves antitrust problems,
since it is the use of monopoly power to force elimination of commercial
activity,71 in that the teams agree not to allow a certain player to remain in
the league. However, its use also involves limitations upon the personal
freedoms of the players. It is a system of private criminal law; practiced
without procedural safeguard, at the fiat of the owners. Since there is no
precise definition of what constitutes an activity which is punishable by
blacklisting, any innocent activity by the player which does not meet with
owner satisfaction may fit into the category.
Potentially, the most serious area of abuse through use of the
blacklist involves a player's personal freedoms. There is no ques-
tion that a star performer's ability to become involved in contro-
versial issues is much greater than that of the journeyman player.
The average player may be labeled as a troublemaker and there-
fore undesirable whereas the star performer is usually considered
untouchable. One's right to exercise his personal civil rights off
the field may in some cases be directly related to his ability to
perform on it.72
Restraints on Owners and Potential Owners
In addition to the above restrictions which involve the relationship of the
league to the player, there are restraints imposed upon owners and poten-
tial owners which also have antitrust implications.
It has been a long-standing objective of the antitrust laws to promote free
entry and expansion within a market as demand arises. Generally, how-
ever, entry into professional sports leagues is conditioned upon acceptance
of the applicant by a high percentage of the existing clubs. 73 The league
is an organization which makes possible a product no single unit could pro-
duce and as such is comparable to a joint venture.7 4 A league is also com-
69. For a further treatment of the Clete Boyer case, See Keeffe, Positively, Mr.
Kipling? Absolutely, Mr. Kuhn! 58 A.B.A.J. 651 (June, 1972).
70. See supra at note 18 to 63 and accompanying text.
71. In Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
such activity was deemed violative of the antitrust laws.
72. Supra note 64, at 466-67.
73. E.g., American League Const. art. 3.1 (b) (1966) (3/4 of existing teams);
NFL Const. art. 3.1 (b) (1966) (vote of 13 of 16 members); NHL Const. art. 3.5
(1947) (3/4 of existing clubs).
74. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964), described a joint venture as, "the chosen competitive instrument of two or
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parable to a trade association, in that it sets standards for the industry and
regulates competition among the clubs. When the structure of an industry
justifies anti-competitive cooperation through trade associations, it is re-
quired that the organization be equally open to all reasonably qualified ap-
plicants. 75 This rule is based on the premise that it should be the needs of
the market which will determine market size, and not economic self-interest.
However, the position taken with regard to professional sports is contrary
to this. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Association of America76 stated that
free entry into a professional sports league could not be required. The gen-
eral requirement could not be maintained due to the necessary relationship
required by scheduling and revenue sharing, which would necessarily fail if
the new entrant were a completely independent unit. A further justification
of entry controls arises from the problem of maintaining a balance of team
strengths which requires stocking new teams from existing teams. Thus,
there seems to be a legitimate purpose in establishing reasonable rules for
entry. However:
The exercise of this legitimate control over entry should ...be
carefully examined, for there would seem to be a built in bias
against expansion, which would bring dilution of the existing teams'
position as one of a very few suppliers of a highly demanded
service. 77
It seems that the leagues should be required to formulate decisions regard-
ing expansion after a reasonable determination of how fast the league could
expand without serious injury to the sport, and to allocate new franchises
on the basis of a valid comparison among the applicants. Presently there
are no such guidelines in the area of professional sports.
The sale of franchises is another area directly regulated by the respective
leagues. Immediately three justifications for this form of regulation can be
seen: first, to insure that those seeking to purchase a team have sufficient
finances; second, to prohibit gambling interests from gaining control of a
team; third, to prevent conflicts of interest. However, it is open to question
whether the league could or does attempt to detect a failure in any of the
three areas.78 Besides the seeming inability of the leagues to enforce the
more corporations previously acting independently and usually competitively with one
another," Id., at 169 and as such may foreclose actual or potential competition among
the parent companies and the progeny. In the context of professional sports the sep-
arate teams (parent corporations) agree to form a league (progeny), which forcloses
a portion of the competition among the teams.
75. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
76. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
77. Supra note 14, at 427.
78. The policy against conflicts of interest did not prevent the sale of the New
York Yankees to the Columbia Broadcasting System. The desire to promote financial
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objectives, the sales restrictions are easily subject to abuse and the power
over sales has been used to punish league mavericks and to interfere with
the business decisions of potential buyers. 79 One commentator has stated:
The tenuousness of the alleged legitimate purposes, the availability
of alternatives, the serious restrictive effects on entry, and the
possibility of abuse all suggest that these restraints on sale are not
sufficiently justified by the peculiarities of the industry to survive
antitrust challenge.80
The Supreme Court has declared that a manufacturer may select whom
he will sell his goods to, where competitive products are readily available
to those not selected. 8 ' The availability of competitive products within a
particular sport is non-existent. For this reason and to avoid possible dis-
criminatory control over sales, the restraints on sales in professional sports
are unreasonable. The Supreme Court in United States v. General Motors
Corp.82 has declared a similarly unreasonable control over sales illegal.
The final regulatory measure results in the curtailment of the owner's
ability to move his franchise. Basically, the restrictions covering franchise
movement are divided into two categories: first, an owner must receive ap-
proval from an extraordinary majority of the owners;8 3 second, the pro-
posed move must be beyond the protected territory of one of the existing
teams.8 4 Antitrust law holds market divisions and territorial restraints to be
per se illegal,8 5 for these activities necessarily have the effect of eliminat-
ing competition. There is a certain justification, however, for this restriction
in the case of a team wishing to move into a city already occupied by an-
other team, since the incumbent team might be sufficiently weakened by
stability for the team must have been overlooked, when the American League allowed
Bob Short to purchase the then Washington Senators.
79. Organized baseball has repeatedly shunned the efforts of Bill Veeck, former
owner of the Chicago White Sox, to regain status as an owner. While he was in Chi-
cago, he continually called for changes in the structure of the game. The sale of the
old Philadelphia Athletics is an example of the use of the veto power to force the sale
of the team to a man who would move the team, rather than to a group that would have
kept the team in Philadelphia. See New York Times, Oct. 16, 1954, at 20, col. 1;
Oct. 18, 1954, at 1, col. 7; Oct. 29, 1954, at 30, col. 1; Nov. 5, 1954, at 25, col. 1;
Nov. 9, 1954, at 332 col. 1.
80. Supra note 14, at 428-29.
81. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
82. 384 U.S. 127 (1966), rev'g 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
83. National League Const. & Rules art. 3.1. (1962) (3/4); American League
Const. art. 3.2 (1966) (3/4). The NHL prohibits any team move, NHL Const. art.
4.2 (1947). Football and basketball follow the baseball requirement of three-fourths.
84. National League Const. & Rules art. 3.2 (1962) (ten miles); American League
Const. art. 3.2 (1966) (one hundred miles); NFL Const. arts. 4.1, 4.3 (generally an
exclusive right to play football within 75 miles); NHL Const. art. 4.1(c) (1947) (fifty
miles). Standards for the NBA and the ABA are unavailable.
85. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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the competition to threaten the entire league. The leagues have also argued
that the prohibition against team movement is primarily for the fan. It
would be unfair to the fan to have a team which he faithfully supported
move away. However, within the last ten years several team owners offered
the chance to move to virgin territory have seized the opportunity.8 6 Again,
because the present system is unregulated, it is easily subject to abuse.
Non-Enforcement
The reserve system, the draft, blacklisting, and owner restraints seem to be
clear violations of the antitrust laws, whether taken individually or collec-
tively. However, there has not been a single instance of governmental ac-
tion to enforce the antitrust laws in the sports area. The reason for this non-
enforcement is not entirely clear. Although baseball enjoys an exemption
from the antitrust laws,8 7 this exemption does not apply to other professional
sports which operate under similarly restrictive systems. As stated by Mi-
chael Schneiderman:
One finds, in the United States, a general willingness to permit the
athlete to sacrifice his personal freedoms in order that the public
may take its sporting pleasure. In this sense the American public
is parasitic upon its professional athlete. . . . As a result of this
general non-enforcement view, the formal distinction between the
position of baseball and the other professional sports under the
antitrust laws becomes immaterial. In practice, all professional
sport is treated as if it were exempt from the antitrust laws.88
This analysis suggests the dilemma facing the professional athlete. He is
faced with a structure which restricts his economic freedoms. When he
seeks enforcement of the laws enacted to prohibit this type of activity he is
faced with either an exemption, or a general unwillingness on the part of
the government to protect his rights due to the possible interruption of the
entertainment of the fans. And if he initiates action on his own, he runs
the danger of being blacklisted from his chosen profession.
86. Some of the teams which have moved in this period are:
formerly now
Kansas City Athletics Oakland A's
Milwaukee Braves Atlanta Braves
Washington Senators Texas Rangers
Seattle Pilots Milwaukee Brewers
Washington Senators Minnesota Twins
St. Louis Hawks Atlanta Hawks
Cincinnatti Royals Kansas City-Omaha Kings
87. Major league baseball has enjoyed an exemption from the antitrust laws since
1922. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). See discussion
infra at notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
88. Supra note 61, at 64-66.
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The recent ruling by the United States Supreme Court retaining base-
ball's antitrust exemption is notable as a clear statement that the Court will
not assert its power to enforce the antitrust laws in this sphere. The case
of Curt Flood offers an interesting context in which to discuss the illogic of
maintaining a non-enforcement policy.
In 1922, the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball Club v. National League,89
ruled that the business of giving baseball exhibitions was exempt from the
antitrust laws. Mr. Justice Holmes writing the opinion for a unanimous
Court stated:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely
state affairs . . . But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions
the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and
must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change
the character of the business . . . [Tjhe transport is a mere inci-
dent, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the
exhibition, although made for money would not be called trade
or commerce in the commonly accepted use of the words.90
Mr. Justice Holmes based his opinion upon the interpretation of interstate
commerce existing in 1922. It is important to note that the basis of the
Holmes opinion was this concept of interstate commerce and his belief that
baseball fell outside the classification.
In 1953, the Supreme Court again agreed to hear an attack upon the re-
serve system. The grant of certiorari, in Toolson v. New York Yankees
Inc.,91 came after the basis of the original decision on the reserve system had
disintegrated. Paul v. Virginia, 2 upon which the Court in Federal Baseball
relied for its interpretation of interstate commerce, was overruled in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.93  The Paul case had held the
insurance business outside the commerce clause because of its local nature.
Justice Holmes had applied this same rationale to baseball. However, in
South Eastern the Court stated:
No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities
across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regula-
tory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot
make an exception of the business of insurance. 94
The Court felt that the exemption from the Commerce Clause had been due
solely to the fact that Congress had not attempted to regulate the field, and
89. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
90. Id. at 208-209.
91. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
92. 8 Wall. 168 (1868).
93. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
94. Id. at 553.
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thus the Paul case was sanctioning state regulation of an interstate business
in the absence of federal legislation. The same rationale could have been
applied to the exemption granted baseball. It was not that the activity of
baseball was beyond the power of Congress, but the Court in Federal Base-
ball was giving the states an opportunity to legislate where Congress had
failed to do so; it did not bar future federal action. The Court in Toolson,
however, by per curiam opinion, affirmed the earlier holding in Federal Base-
ball. The Court expressed strong concern that there had been a lack of
Congressional action to change the exemption granted by Federal Baseball
that baseball had developed in reliance on the earlier decision for 30 years.
From the ruling in Toolson to the recent Flood case, there have been a
number of attempts to apply the antitrust exemption to other professional
sports and businesses built around the performance of local exhibitions; in
every case the Court has refused to grant an exemption."5 In Radovich v.
National Football League, the Court specifically limited Toolson and Fed-
eral Baseball and declared that football was within the ambit of the anti-
trust laws:
• . . [S]ince Toolson and Federal Baseball are still cited as con-
trolling authority in antitrust actions involving other fields of busi-
ness, we now specifically limit the rule there established to the
facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized professional
baseball. 96
Basketball was included within the ambit of the antitrust laws by Haywood
v. National Basketball Association.97
Thus, when the Curt Flood case reached the Court, the antitrust exemp-
tion had been limited strictly to baseball and the basis of the exemption had
been weakened due to the broadened view of interstate commerce. How-
ever, the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun writing for the majority, refused
to disturb the holdings of Toolson and Federal Baseball. Speaking of the
exemption he said:
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century,
one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis,
and one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of inter-
state commerce. It rests on a recognition and acceptance of base-
ball's unique characteristics and needs. 98
95. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (theatrical productions);
United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing); Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Haywood v. National Basketball
Association, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (professional basketball).
96. 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957).
97. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
98. - U.S. -, 92 S. Ct. 2099, 2112 (1972).
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What the unique characteristics and needs are which distinguish major
league baseball from the other professional sports was not disclosed. The
decision was based upon Congressional inaction in face of Federal Baseball
and a strict application of stare decisis due to major league baseball's reliance
on the original decision. Mr. Justice Blackmun seemed undeterred by his
own finding that, "professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in
interstate commerce." 99  This finding obviates any validity in applying stare
decisis since it destroys the basis of Federal Baseball. The reliance of major
league baseball upon the original decision should not deter the Court from
applying the antitrust laws. It has never been the law that particular deci-
sions, even on consent, were contracts between courts and litigants. 100 To
hold that the Court must protect business interests built in reliance on prior
decision could dangerously limit the adaptability and growth of the law, to
say nothing of the one-sided nature of this approach when considering the
interests of the other parties involved.
Justice Blackmun discussed congressional inaction in the following man-
ner:
We continue to be loathe, 50 years after Federal Baseball and al-
most two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially
when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions
to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication,
has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively. 101
This belief that congressional inaction evinces a desire to maintain the ex-
emption is based solely on the failure of Congress to pass any legislation
ending the exemption. However, this view fails to take cognizance of the
fact that Congress has failed to enact legislation broadening the exemption
to include other professional sports. Furthermore, congressional inaction is
inherently devoid of interpretation, it can only be viewed as inaction.1 0 2
Nor does want of specific Congressional repudiations . . .serve as
an implied instruction by Congress to us not to reconsider, in the
light of new experience . . . those decisions. . . . It would re-
quire very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional si-
lence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines.
• . . Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy
might be suggested for the inaction of . . .Congress, but they
would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand
99. Id. at 2112.
100. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). See also United
States v. Lucky Larger Brewing Co., 209 F. Supp. 665 (D. Utah 1962); United States v.
Savannah Cotton & Naval Stores Exchange, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Ga. 1960);
United States v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 178 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
101. - U.S. -, -, 92 S. Ct. 2099, 2112 (1972).
102. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a con-
trolling legal principle. 103
The decision is an unfortunate one. The Court had the opportunity to
overrule the "aberration" granted in Federal Baseball and bring baseball
into line with the other sports. The Court could have remanded the case
to the District Court for a trial on the issues of per se violations, reasonable-
ness, and the labor exemption. However, the Court avoided the issues, and
by so doing has seemingly eliminated itself as a forum where the problem
can be rectified.
Equal Protection
This analysis of professional sport leagues has shown that at the present
time the most restrictive sport is baseball, followed by football and basket-
ball.' 04 Due to its exemption from the antitrust laws, baseball has been
free to practice group boycott, 10 5 market division,106 and lesser antitrust vio-
lations. Both football and basketball violate the antitrust laws, and neither
enjoys an exemption from the law. Except for isolated attacks, the league
structures have stood firm in the face of antitrust policy. As stated previ-
ously,10 7 there has been a non-enforcement policy with regard to professional
sports which has in effect exempted all league sports from the antitrust laws.
As a result, athletes, because of their profession, have been afforded second
class rights. This discrimination varies depending upon which sport the ath-
lete plays. Thus, through non-enforcement athletes have effectively been
denied equal protection of the laws. Profession Michael Schneiderman has
stated:
In those areas where constitutional mandate is itself involved,
clearly any administrative view with regard to the popular will to
enforce is irrelevant. Although the more leeway persists in the
area of statutory interpretation, there remain two important limi-
tations upon interpretive and administrative discretion: (1) the
Constitution itself must be seen to require fair and equal inter-
pretation and enforcement of the laws, and (2) it may be neces-
sary to recognize that the federal antitrust (and labor) laws them-
selves have constitutional dimensions. The rights those laws elab-
orate originate not in the statutes but in the Constitution and,
consequently, the rights themselves enjoy an entrenchment that is
not subject to the vagaries of ordinary statutory interpretation.108
103. Id. at 119-21.
104. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
105. Supra notes 31 to 38 and accompanying text.
106. Supra notes 73 to 75 and accompanying text.
107. Supra notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text.
108. Supra note 61, at 66,
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The enforcement of the antitrust laws against the illegal operations of the
leagues seems mandated by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The antitrust laws should be applied equally in all sports, and
the application should be equal to the enforcement of those laws outside
sports. 0 9
Conclusion
The answer to the problems plagueing professional sports seems to lie not in
the formation of a Federal Sports Commission, which some have suggested,
but in the treatment of professional sport as a normal commercial activity,
subject to the normal standards of behavior. All leagues should be com-
petitive, i.e., each league within a specific sport would be separate, thus of-
fering the players the opportunity to negotiate their services among competi-
tors. Placing sports on this plane will end protection for the privileged and
open sports to the test of competitive activity which can insure protection of
the rights of the athletes. A step in this direction is currently being consid-
ered in Congress. Senator Sam Ervin has introduced a bill 1 0 which will end
all antitrust exemptions and bar the proposed basketball merger. As has
been stated by one commentator:
• . . fostering the creation of new leagues may be a useful con-
tribution which antitrust law enforcement could make to insuring
that the extensive restraints on competition required in professional
sports do not prevent the satisfaction of consumer desire for more
sports and player desire for a more favorable bargaining posi-
tion.11'
An application of the antitrust laws to all professional sports must be fol-
lowed by a criminal enforcement policy which will be equal to the applica-
tion in other commercial endeavors involving such a substantial amount of
commerce and such a tremendous impact upon the American people.
James F. Foley
109. As stated by Congressman Emmanuel Celler:
" . . The important thing is to once and for all end unwarranted privilege
and place all professional sports on equal footing. In the past the sports
monopolists have come before this sub-committee defending their claimed ex-
emption from the antitrust laws because the health of professional sports is in
the community interest. But when these community-minded gentlemen have
left the halls of Congress, too often their actions have exhibited utter disregard
for the communities that support them. Ticket prices skyrocket, television re-
ception is blacked out, greedy threats of franchise moves are made upon mu-
nicipal officials, teams jump from city to city betraying life long supporters.
110. S. 373.
111. Supra note 14, at 434.
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